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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 55 SUMMER 1981 NUMBER 4
THE HIGHWAYS AND BYWAYS OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
LAWRENCE H. COOKE*
Much has been said of the crisis of the courts, a crisis of over-
load.' Several causes immediately come to mind-a mushrooming
population, a mobile society, commercial growth, an expansion of
rights, an expansion of causes of action, pretrial mechanisms, and
post-trial procedures. 2 Our experience and statistical analyses indi-
cate that a voluminous amount of litigation must grind through
our judicial machinery annually.3 Mountains exist and they must
* Chief Judge of the State of New York; B.S., Georgetown University, 1935; LL.B.,
Albany Law School, 1938. This article is adapted from the 1981 Charles Evans Hughes Me-
morial Lecture, delivered by the Chief Judge at the New York County Lawyers' Association
on March 19, 1981.
1 See COMMITrEE ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
THE NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, (1977) [hereinafter cited as U.S. DRP'T OF JUSTIcE]; H.
ZEISEL, H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (2d ed. 1978); see, e.g., Bell,
Crises in the Courts: Proposals for Change, 31 VANm. L. REV. 3 (1978); Belli, The Law's
Delays: Reforming Unnecessary Delay in Civil Litigation, 8 J. LEGIS. 16 (1981).
Although the stability of our increasingly complex society requires an effective dispute
processing mechanism, see Bell, supra, at 8, the onerous demands on our judicial system
make delays in the resolution process inevitable. E. JOHNSON, JR., PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESSING CIVwL DISPUTES 2 (1978). Overloaded courts have
been forced to adjust their processes, often adopting methods which threaten the integrity
of the entire judicial process. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra, at 3. Our failure to devise a
lasting solution to this problem endangers the future of our judicial system. Miller, A Pro-
gram for the Elimination of the Hardships of Litigation Delay, in COURT CONGESTION AND
DELAY 2 (G. Miller ed. 1971).
2 See Bell, supra note 1, at 4; Belli, supra note 1, at 17-20. Reasons for court congestion
abound. The inefficient management of the court system by the judiciary and the procrasti-
nation of lawyers and judges have been proffered as additional causes of court delay. See id.,
at 18-20. Insufficient numbers of trial judges also have contributed to the litigation delay.
See Miller, supra note 1, at 4-5.
3 Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 66 A.B.A.J. 295, 295, 297
(1980). Statistics released by the Administrative Office of the United States indicate a dra-
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be negotiated. Just as byways divert the flow of traffic from the
highways, secondary systems of dispute resolution should be used
to reduce the demands placed upon the traditional court system.
The conventional forum for dispute resolution, the court, has
become a beleaguered institution. Consequently, the quality of jus-
tice is endangered.4 With crime rates soaring across the nation,
civil litigation rocketing to new highs, and a tight economy in pros-
pect for the eighties, the situation soon could deteriorate even fur-
ther.5 No authority is needed for the proposition that overcrowded
court dockets lead to delay, and a delay of justice is itself an injus-
tice. The signposts of history display their warnings. The Magna
Carta contained a pledge against it. 6 Juvenal, the first century Ro-
man satirical poet, cynically grieved that "the time is gone for
hearing, and the tedious suit goes on."17 Still earlier, the prophet
Habakkuk complained of the benumbered nature of the law, not-
ing that "justice is never in action, for evil men hamper the just till
justice goes awry.""
We are proud of our government and cherish our way of life,
but our appreciation will not register well unless a viable solution
is devised and administered. As Woodrow Wilson once observed,
"a constitutional government is as good as its courts; no better, no
matic increase in litigation over the past few years. See [1979] A. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS 4-
7. During 1979, 154,666 civil cases were filed in the federal courts, a 77.1% increase over the
number of civil cases filed in 1970. Id. Over the nine year period ending in 1979, the number
of pending civil cases increased by 90.8%. Id.
Although the overload dilemma also has affected state courts, reforms instituted by the
New York judiciary have been successful in reducing court congestion. See Cooke Reports
Continued Drop in Backlog of Civil Actions, N.Y.L.J., July 29, 1981, at 1, col. 2.
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3. Similar sentiments were expressed as
early as 1958:
[D]elay and the choking congestion in the federal courts today have created a
crucial problem for constitutional government in the United States. It is so chron-
ically prevalent that it is compromising the quantity and quality of justice availa-
ble to the individual citizen and, in so doing, it is leaving vulnerable. . . the repu-
tation of the United States for protecting and securing [its citizens'] rights and
remedies.
Address by Hon. Earl Warren, Chief Justice of the United States, American Law Institute
Annual Meeting (1958), reprinted in THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 5 (1962).
a See Bell, supra note 1, at 5. One commentator has stated that unless legislatures
respond to the overload crisis, the judicial system may deteriorate to the point where "lay-
men will be tempted to circumvent the legal process entirely." Belli, supra note 1, at 16.
6 "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right or justice." MAGNA
CARTA, cl. 40 (1215), reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 327 (1969).
7 SATIRES XVI (Dryden translations).
6 Habakkuk 1:4.
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DISPUTE RESOLUTION
worse." 9 Though our judicial system may well be the best ever con-
trived, it is presently incapable of satisfactorily meeting its as-
signed task.
For too long, too many in the legal profession have myopically
assumed that courts are the only forum for dispute resolution. We
have been raised on the notion that our system of jurisprudence is
the greatest ever devised, and so it is. Many in the legal profession
are apprehensive that new prescriptions will be annoying to master
and will threaten their economic status.10 Despite this apprehen-
sion, there has been movement beyond mere mechanical reliance
upon the courts and toward alternative techniques of dispute reso-
lution. Indeed, alternatives to conventional adjudicative methods
must be developed if our structure of justice, erected on a court
foundation, is to function effectively. Fortunately, approaches have
been isolated by advanced scholars and studied by the likes of the
Ford Foundation,"- the National Center for State Courts,1 2 the Na-
tional Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,1 3 and
the American Bar Association. 4 An old proverb instructs us that
"[a]ll mankind is divided into three classes: those that are immove-
able, those that are moveable, and those that move." Similarly, the
business of litigation may be classified into two broad categories:
civil and criminal. Surprisingly to some, each category contains in-
viting options for alleviation.
THE CwvL SYSTEm
Examining the civil areas which provide fertile ground for in-
novative implants to satisfy the appetite of a litigation hungry gen-
W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (1908).
10 See Belli, supra note 1, at 16. For suggestions on lawyer participation in court re-
form, see Joiner, Lawyer Attitudes Toward Law and Procedural Reform, in COURT CONGES-
TION AND DELAY 60-64 (G. Winters ed. 1971).
1 See FORD FOUNDATION, NEW APPROACHES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as FORD FOUNDATION].
12 See E. JOHNSON, JR., V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSmE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES (1977) (a publication of the National Center for
State Courts) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON & KANTOR].
13 See D. AARONSON, B. HOFF, P. JASzi, N. KrrrRm & D. SAARI, THE NEW JUSTICE: AL-
TERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION (1977) [hereinafter cited as AARON-
SON]; E. JOHNSON, JR., A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESSING
CIVIL DISPUTES (1978) (reports funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, and the United States
Department of Justice).
', See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TEN CURES FOR COURT CONGESTION (1959).
1981]
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eration, one immediately discerns three distinct subcategories of
alternatives: (1) legislative establishment of different modes of re-
covery for certain types of injury;15 (2) measures operating within
the traditional court outline designed to eliminate or reduce court
time;"6 and (3) measures taken prior to resort to the courts and
operating outside of them."
Legislative Changes in the Substantive Law
Legislatures can enact changes in the substantive law that will
reduce court system pressures by either removing some disputes
from the courts or simplifying court processing. The removal of
disputes may best be illustrated by no-fault automobile insur-
ance. 8 With the advent of this type of compensation plan, an ag-
grieved party is granted relief without an adjudication of the un-
derlying dispute."" Pursuant to a contract with the insurance
carrier, the injured party collects from his or her insurance com-
pany irrespective of fault. Thus, court intervention is rendered
unnecessary.20
1" See notes 18-36 and accompanying text infra.
16 See notes 37-53 and accompanying text infra.
17 See notes 54-71 and accompanying text infra.
'8 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319 to 38-351a (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 627.730 to 627.741 (West 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.41 to 65B.71 (West Supp.
1981). See generally King, Accident Reparation: Reappraisal and Reform, 3 CONN. L. REV.
268 (1971); Lamel & Sands, Insurance Law, 1977 Survey of New York Law, 29 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 385 (1978).
'9 See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 671, 672 (McKinney Supp. 1980). The basic purposes of the
New York no-fault insurance law are to compensate for economic loss without recourse to
the courts and to provide that there is no duplicative compensation. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Brooks, 101 Misc. 2d 704, 709-10, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1979); cf. Estate of Nelson, 102 Misc. 2d 391, 393, 423 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (Sur. Ct.
Bronx County 1979) (primary purpose of no-fault legislation was to ensure rapid payment of
benefits without regard to fault and without necessity for retention of counsel). No-fault
insurance plans have been upheld against constitutional attack. See Montgomery v. Daniels,
38 N.Y.2d 41, 45, 340 N.E.2d 444, 446, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1975).
20 No-fault automobile insurance systems have not abolished totally tort actions. Gen-
erally, most states employ a modified no-fault system which permits tort recovery for claims
above a certain monetary threshold or for certain types of injuries. JOHNSON & KANTOR,
supra note 12, at 12-13. In New York, for instance, injured parties may recover up to
$50,000 without resort to the courts. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671 (McKinney Supp. 1980). Hawaii,
on the other hand, provides for a floating threshold whereby the monetary threshold is ad-
justed annually. See HAwAII REv. STAT. §§ 294-6(a)(2), 294-10(b) (1976 & Supp. 1980); Yee,
Tradition and the Political Process: The Evolution of No-Fault Legislation in the State of
Hawaii, 10 FORUM 870, 875 (1975). See generally Henderson, No-Fault Insurance for Auto-
mobile Accidents: Status and Effect in the United States, 56 OR. L. REv. 287 (1977). Addi-
tionally, some right of subrogation still exists under most no-fault statutes. See, e.g., HAWAII
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No-fault compensation systems generally have proven effective
in reducing court workloads. 2' The theory underlying this system
of compensation should be examined for possible expansion to in-
clude such fields as medical malpractice, products liability, and
other appropriate species of common-law tort liability.2 2 New Zea-
land, for example, has adopted a comprehensive no-fault scheme
which compensates for any economic injury regardless of its
source.23 Automotive and occupational injuries, of course, are in-
REV. STAT. § 294-7 (Supp. 1980); N.Y. INS. LAW § 673 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
11 Massachusetts has conducted the most extensive studies concerning the impact of
no-fault automobile legislation on court workloads. See Widiss & Bovbjerg, No Fault in
Massachusetts: Its Impact on Courts and Lawyers, 59 A.B.A.J. 487, 487-88 (1973). Official
court statistics indicate that the caseload has dropped 87% in the district courts and 70%
in the superior courts since the introduction of no-fault legislation. Bovbjerg, The Impact of
No-Fault Auto Insurance on Massachusetts Courts, 11 NEw ENG. L. REV. 325, 329-31
(1976). Conversely, a study of the impact of Delaware's no-fault insurance statute reveals no
decrease in the number of automobile tort cases filed since the advent of no-fault legislation.
See Clark & Waterson, "No-Fault" in Delaware, 6 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 225, 231 (1974). Dela-
ware's no-fault system, however, places no limitation on the insured's right to maintain a
tort action. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118(a)(3) (1974).
21 Commentators have explored the possibility of extending the concept of no-fault
compensation to other areas. See, e.g., Atiyah, No Fault Compensation: A Question That
Will Not Go Away, 54 TtL. L. REv. 271 (1980); O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for Injuries
Arising from Medical Treatment: A Proposal for Elective Coverage, 24 EMORY L. J. 21, 27
(1975); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Accidents: A Proposal
and an "Economic" Analysis, 42 TENN. L. REV. 145 (1974).
23 See Accident Compensation Act 1972, 1973 REPR. STAT. N.Z. §§ 4(2), 5(1), reprinted
in C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, JR. & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 893-94 (3d ed.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Accident Compensation Act]. The New Zealand plan was enacted
to provide a solution to a dilemma frequently encountered by personal injury victims:
[T]hey must turn to three entirely different remedies, and frequently they are
aided by none.
The negligence action is a form of lottery. In the case of industrial accidents it
provides inconsistent solutions for less than one victim in every hundred. The
Workers' Compensation Act provides meagre compensation for workers, but only
if their injury occurred at their work. The Social Security Act will assist with the
pressing needs of those who remain, provided they can meet the means test. All
others are left to fend for themselves.
Such a fragmented and capricious response to a social problem which cries
out for co-ordinated and comprehensive treatment cannot be good enough .... It
is a situation which needs to be changed.
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW
ZEALAND 19 (1967), reprinted in C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, JR., & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 889 (3d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as WOODHOUSE REPORT]. Thus, the
New Zealand system of injury insurance is based upon the dual principles of community
responsibility and comprehensive entitlement. WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra, at 19. For a dis-
cussion of the New Zealand plan, see Harris, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: A
Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD. L. REv. 361 (1974). See also Franklin, Personal
Injury Accidents in New Zealand and the United States: Some Striking Similarities, 27
1981]
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cluded within the New Zealand plan.' Fault is irrelevant and com-
pensation is based upon a percentage of weekly income25 and dam-
age suits are not permitted. 26 As the New Zealand scheme vividly
illustrates, the no-fault concept can be transplanted successfully to
other areas.
Probate administration is another area which has become the
focal point of legislative reform. Significant portions of estate
funds and court budgets are often consumed in a lengthy and
costly probate process.21 Studies reveal that an outrageously long
time may be required to close an estate.2" The National Conference
of Commissions on Uniform State Laws has instituted reform
through the promulgation of its Uniform Probate Code (UPC).29
Under the UPC, the personal representative of the decedent ad-
ministers the estate without court intervention."0 Court supervision
occurs on particular issues only when disputes arise between inter-
ested parties. 1 This system provides an excellent example of legis-
lation which eliminates unnecessary court involvement.3 2 Another
STAN. L. REv. 653 (1975).
24 See Accident Compensation Act, supra note 23, at §§ 67 & 92. The Act also compen-
sates for bodily harm sustained by the victims of certain criminal offenses. An Act to Amend
the Accident Compensation Act 1972, 1974 REPR. STAT. N.Z. § 105B, reprinted in C. GREG-
ORY, H. KALVEN, JR., & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 896 (3d ed. 1977). See G
v. Auckland Hosp. Bd., [1976] N.Z.L.R. 638, 639-40 (Sup. Ct. Auckland 1975).
22 The New Zealand plan was designed to provide income-related compensation for in-
come loss. See WOODHOUSE REPORT, supra note 23, at 19-22.
2 Accident Compensation Act, supra note 23, at § 5(1). For a discussion of the New
Zealand legislation, see Palmer, Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the
Common Law in New Zealand; 21 AM. J. Comp. L. 1 (1973); Palmer & Lemons, Toward the
Disappearance of Tort Law-New Zealand's New Compensation Plan, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
693.
27 JOHNSON & KANTOR, supra note 12, at 25.
28 In Minnesota, for example, a 1974 study indicated that large estates required 3 years
to administer while small estates required an average of 16 months for resolution. Stein,
Probate Administration Study: Some Emerging Conclusions, 9 REAL PROP., PROBATE &
TRUST J. 596, 602 (1974). See also Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for
Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453 (1970).
29 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 1-101 to -403. The Uniform Probate Code (UPC) was
promulgated in 1969 and amended in 1975. Fourteen states have adopted the UPC in whole
or in part. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-1101 to 14-7307 (West 1975 & Supp. 1980);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 731.005 to .302 (West 1976 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 15-1-101 to -7-
307 (1979 & Supp. 1981); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 700.1 to .993 (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 (West 1975 & Supp. 1981).
20 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-701 to 3-721 (duties and powers of personal rep-
resentatives).
21 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE §§ 3-501 to 3-505 (supervised administration).
22 JOHNSON & KANTOR, supra note 12, at 28.
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innovation which has simplified the process of probate administra-
tion is the summary disposition of small estates.33 Though the pro-
cedure varies among those states which have enacted this reform,
3 4
its overall effect has been to alleviate the delay and overload en-
countered in the probate courts. Expansion of these procedures
merits investigation.
No-fault divorce also has yielded savings in court time by re-
ducing the need for professional assistance.3 5 In those states which
have enacted no-fault divorce statutes,38 a party need not establish
a fault ground to "justify" the granting of a divorce decree.37 With
fewer issues in dispute, the divorce can be implemented in a
shorter time and with less expense. This method of reducing court
time could possibly be expanded to other areas of the law.
Alterations Within the Traditional Court Framework
Significant alterations also have been suggested within the
traditional court system. These alterations are intended to relieve
" In addition to meeting the immediate needs of the family by providing a low cost,
expeditious alternative, the summary settlement of small estates protects creditors, the
state, and other interested persons by requiring a judicial proceeding. Sullivan & Hack,
Streamlining Probate-A Proposal to Expand Summary Settlement, 51 MARQ. L. RE V. 150,
153 (1968). A number of states have adopted summary administration procedures. See, e.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.51 (West 1975); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1304 (McKinney 1967
& Supp. 1980); T~x. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 139-143 (Vernon 1980).
34 Summary administration of estates may be merely a grant of statutory authority to
secure a property interest in the decedent's estate solely on the basis of a clerk-approved
affidavit, see, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 1304 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1980), or
summary administration may involve formal judicial supervision with shorter and more sim-
plified procedures. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.51 (West 1975). See also 1975 Legisla-
tion on Trusts and Estates, 11 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 99, 100 (1976).
• No-fault divorce laws modify the law of domestic relations by eliminating the neces-
sity of establishing marital fault as a predicate for divorce. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §
4506(1) (West 1970 & Supp. 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1, 598.17 (West Supp. 1981); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.025 (1979). By so doing, no-fault divorce statutes reduce the time required
to adjudicate a divorce proceeding. JOHNSON & KANTOR, supra note 12, at 31.
1 Some states have retained traditional fault-oriented grounds but have added no-fault
provisions. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 30-102 (1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (1981).
Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052 (West 1981) (sole grounds for divorce are that the marriage is
irretrievably broken or that one of the parties is mentally incompetent). New York, how-
ever, requires a consensual separation for a statutorily-defined 1 year period. N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney Supp. 1971). Cf. Comment, Oregon's No-Fault Marriage Dis-
solution Act, 51 OR. L. REv. 715, 717 (1972) ("irreconcilable differences" causing "irremedi-
able breakdown" of marriage).
" No-fault divorce statutes are premised on the belief that an inquiry into the causes
of broken marriages does not necessarily serve the public interest. See JOHNSON & KANTOR,
supra note 12, at 31-32.
1981]
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the strain on the legal machinery by reducing or eliminating court
time. Since courts must be both physically accessible and tempo-
rally affordable, these suggestions should be implemented.
Public policy has long favored the private settlement of dis-
putes.38 Consequently, various procedures have been designed with
built-in economic incentives to settle. A Michigan procedure com-
bines mediation with economic inducement in tort cases where lia-
bility is not in issue.39 The procedure commences when a three-
member panel reviews documentary evidence and recommends a
settlement.40 If its proposal is rejected, attorneys' fees and trial
costs may be assessed based on the difference between the settle-
ment recommendation and the actual award.41 Since a penalty may
result from either party's refusal of a reasonable settlement offer,
31 E.g., Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910); Slade v. Shearuon, Ham-
mill & Co., 79 F.R.D. 309, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stull v. Baker, 410 F. Supp. 1326, 1332
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"9 MICH. GEN. CT. R. 501.1 enables the Michigan circuit courts to provide a mediation
docket by court rule and requires the adoption of a procedure "for placing actions upon the
pretrial calendar or mediation docket or otherwise assigning a time and place for pretrial
hearing or mediation without necessity of a request therefor." Though only applicable to the
Wayne County Circuit Court, id., see MICH. GEN. CT. R. 316.1(b), subrule 501.1 has been in
effect since 1971. Miller, Mediation in Michigan, 56 JUDICATURE 290, 293 (1973). 3D Cm.
LocAL R. 403 outlines the mediation procedure adopted pursuant to this rule-making au-
thority. MICH. GEN. CT. R. 316.1(b). Despite its inherent limitations, the mediation system
has been an effective weapon in the battle against docket congestion. Canham, A Judge
Comments on Mediation's Success, 56 JUDICATURE 290, 294 (1973).
Michigan's general court rules recently were amended to allow courts outside of Wayne
County to submit to mediation "any civil case in which the relief sought consists of money
damages or division of property." MICH. GEN. CT. R. 316.1(a). Although the mediation panel
must be composed of three members, id. at 316.4(a), the selection procedures and minimum
qualifications of its members are to be established by administrative order. Id. at 316.4(b).
The mediation process is similar to the procedure employed in Wayne County. See notes 40-
41 and accompanying text infra. Once a party rejects the panel's evaluation, the case is tried
in the usual manner. If the plaintiff rejects the evaluation, he must obtain a verdict which
exceeds the evaluation by more than 10% or bear the defendant's actual costs. MICH. GEN.
CT. R. 316.7(b)(1). Attorney's fees necessitated by the rejection are included within the cal-
culation of actual costs. Id. at 316.8.
40 The Wayne County mediation system applies to automobile accident claims without
complex legal or factual issues, and may be extended by stipulation to non-automobile
cases. Miller, Mediation in Michigan, 56 JUDICATURE 290, 290 (1973). Documentary evidence
is presented to a panel consisting of two attorneys and a judge. Id. at 290. Although no
testimony is received in evidence at the hearing, the panel questions the parties in order to
clarify the documentary evidence. Id. at 290-91.
"I Id. Regardless of the panel's evaluation, either party may proceed to trial. Id. at 291.
If a litigant rejects the evaluation and does not receive a final judgment at least 10% more
favorable than the evaluation, he must pay his opponent's costs, including his attorney's fee.
Id.
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both parties share the risk.42
Under the English "Payment into Court System," the defen-
dant deposits a sum by way of a compromise offer. 3 If the offer is
refused and the ultimate award is greater than the tender, the
plaintiff is entitled to the usual award of costs. Should the final
award prove to be less than the amount tendered, the plaintiff
must pay his own costs as well as those of the defendant from the
date of deposit.44 The flaw here is that the carrot-and-stick ploy
works exclusively on plaintiffs while defendants bear no risk. For-
mal court involvement, however, is eliminated from the actual ad-
justment process. Another suggestion, advanced by Earl Johnson,
Professor of Law at the University of Southern California and Di-
rector of its Program for the Study of Dispute Resolution Policy,
requires that both parties submit final binding offers to court.45 If
there is no overlap, the case would proceed to trial and a penalty
would be assessed against the party whose offer was least reasona-
ble.46 In an attempt to balance advantages between parties, a
greater penalty would be assessed against an institutional party.
The West German Stuttgart Model disposes of civil cases
through a series of preliminary hearings designed to define and
narrow the factual issues.47 Following an informal presentation
without witnesses, a three-judge panel proffers a resolution and
suggests a settlement.4  Rejection of their recommendation re-
42 Id.
43 See Administration of Justice Act, 1969, c.58, § 20. When a defendant realizes that
he will probably lose on the issue of liability, he offers the plaintiff less than he feels the
court is likely to award. M. ZANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 60
(3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ZANDER]. The defendant deposits this money with the
court, and the plaintiff, at any time prior to trial, may settle at this amount. Id.
14 ZANDER, supra note 43, at 60. If a plaintiff chooses not to settle and the final award is
less than the amount paid into court, the plaintiff is responsible for his own costs as well as
the defendant's costs. Id.
45 E. JOHNSON, JR., A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESS-
ING CIVIL DispUTEs 31 (1978). Professor Johnson suggests that many of the problems and
inequities found in the English system could be eliminated, and a modified procedure could
be introduced in the United States. Id.
46 Id. This differs from the English "Payment into Court System" since either party
could be penalized for "unreasonableness," as measured by the difference between their
final offer and the final judgment. Id.
47 See FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 31-35. The West German Stuttgart Model,
developed by Judge Rolf Bender, is utilized in one-third of the civil courts in Germany. Id.
at 32.
4' Under the Stuttgart system, the court clerk circulates all documents among the par-
ties. Id. at 32. A three-judge panel then reviews the documentary evidence and conducts an
initial hearing at which it suggests a settlement. Id.
1981]
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quires a detailed explanation and, after a plenary evidentiary hear-
ing, the court proposes final judgment. 9 Statistics reveal that the
vast majority of cases do not proceed beyond the initial hearing. e
Through constant interaction among the court, attorneys, and par-
ties, this model fosters an understanding of the competing inter-
ests involved. Since the Stuttgart prototype requires the court to
assume an active role in case development, it may not be appropri-
ate in nations where the adversary mold prevails. A beneficial ac-
commodation between the two systems would exalt the respective
roles of the parties and the court in the conciliation process,
thereby increasing the likelihood of amicable adjustment without
full formal adjudication.
Court-annexed arbitration is available in many states as a pre-
liminary alternative to traditional judicial resolution of disputes al-
ready in the system.51 This process is mandatory for disputes
within a jurisdictional ceiling and the arbitration decision is bind-
ing unless trial de novo is sought.5 2 Where court-annexed arbitra-
tion is voluntarily chosen, the decision has an obligatory character
without any de novo trial right.5 3 The virtues of this procedure in-
clude accelerated case disposition and reduced litigation costs.5 4 By
" Id. at 33. The parties need not accept the initial settlement proposal. If they reject it,
however, they must give detailed reasons for their rejection. Id. at 32. A rejection is followed
by another hearing which results in a final proposed settlement. Id. at 33.
50 Id. at 33. Only one hearing is necessary in 85 to 90% of the civil cases. Id.
"' See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10-.32 (Deering Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIV. PRAc.
LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7361-7362 (Purdon Supp.
1981).
52 Pennsylvania, for example, requires arbitration for most civil cases in which the dam-
ages do not exceed $20,000. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7361(a), (b) (Purdon Supp. 1981). A
panel of three lawyers serve as arbitrators. Id. § 7361(a). Each party has the right to appeal
for a trial de novo in the court, but that party must pay the costs of the arbitration. Id.
§ 7361(d). If neither party appeals, the judgment entered on the arbitrator's award is en-
forced. Id. See generally Rosenberg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration
of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 HARV. L. REv. 448, 450-53 (1961).
11 In New York City, for example, parties in small claims court are given the choice of
arbitration with no appeal. At the initial hearing, parties are encouraged to submit their
case to an arbitrator, but they must agree to be bound by such arbitration. N.Y. CrrY Civ.
CT. R. § 2900.33(0)(2). Although the decision to arbitrate theoretically is voluntary, it has
been noted that court personnel pressure the parties to submit their controversy to arbitra-
tion. Determan, The Arbitration of Small Claims, 10 FORUM 831, 834-35 (1975). See JOHN-
SON & KANTOR, supra note 12, at 44; E. JOHNSON, JR., A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNA-
TIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESSING CIVIL DISPUTES 58 (1978).
" Under the California arbitration system, the average time spent on a personal injury
case was 2.5 hours. An average of 3.3 days was required when a jury trial was demanded.
CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN THE JUDICIAL PRO-
css 78 (1972). Under the Pennsylvania arbitration system, see note 50 supra, it is esti-
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significantly alleviating the need for support personnel, arbitration
decreases the fiscal outlays required by the court system. Thus,
arbitration offers a viable alternative to traditional court
adjudication.
Changes Outside the Traditional Court Framework
Certain practices may be employed outside the formal judicial
structure prior to resort to the courts. Contractual arbitration, for
instance, is encountered in commercial and labor settings and its
parameters have been authoritatively delineated by a considerable
body of case law. 5 Moreover, in recent years, arbitration has been
used to settle disputes involving insured motorists and their insur-
ance carriers stemming from accidents with uninsured motorists.56
The benefits derived from arbitrating this type of dispute include
the possibility of lower insurance premiums and speedier payment
of claims.5
Voluntary associations, such as those handling consumer com-
plaints with the support of the Better Business Bureau, also em-
mated that an arbitrated dispute costs the system a total of $110, whereas a trial costs
between $500 and $600 per day. JOHNSON & KANTOR, supra note 12, at 45-46; see Rosenberg
& Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74
HARV. L. REV. 448, 458-64 (1961).
11 In the absence of a statutory provision for arbitration of disputes, the parties must
rely on private agreements to remove their disputes from the courts. Henderson, Contrac-
tual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA.
L. REV. 947, 948 (1972). These agreements are prevalent in labor and commercial contracts.
Note, Contractual Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes: Waiver of Right to Compel Arbitra-
tion, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1979). There has been considerable conflict concerning
the enforceability of arbitration agreements. Henderson, supra, at 948. Several states have
passed statutes, however, which outline the criteria for enforceability. See, e.g., D.C. UNI-
FORM ARBITRATION Acr, D.C. CODE ANN. App. § 16-2 (Supp. V 1978), N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§
7501-7508 (McKinney 1980). Arbitration agreements are viewed favorably by the courts.
See, e.g., Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge, Highway and Transp. Dist., 23 Cal. 3d 180, 189, 588
P.2d 1261, 1266, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 842 (1979) See generally Note, Contractual Agree-
ments to Arbitrate Disputes, supra, at 1515-21.
" The arbitration clause in the standard uninsured-motorist contract provides for arbi-
tration whenever a voluntary settlement cannot be reached. Aksen, Judicial Review of Un-
insured-Motorist Arbitration Awards, 48 OR. L. REV. 74, 74 (1968). See also Hines, Com-
mittee on Insurance Arbitration, 10 FORUM 805, 810 (1975).
7 The advantages of arbitrating automobile accident disputes may include "cost reduc-
tion in premiums, greater distribution of loss payments, speedy payment of claims, reduc-
tion of court congestion, and lowering of the incidence of fraud." Aksen, Arbitration of
Automobile Accident Cases, 1 CONN. L. REV. 70, 71 (1968). Although some disagreement
exists as to whether arbitration actually achieves all of these benefits, it does reduce the cost
of premiums and fosters speedier payment of claims. Id. at 78-87.
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ploy arbitration procedures to resolve disputes." These associa-
tions also have achieved a degree of success.59 Arbitration is not a
new wonder; indeed, it was extolled by Aristotle. 0 Its use can now
be expanded with some degree of promise to other areas by agree-
ment or statute, such as landlord-tenant disputes and medical mal-
practice. 1 In the Housing Courts of the Civil Court of the City of
New York, 100,000 cases were filed last year alone. 2 Any signifi-
cant portion of that number which could be diverted into arbitra-
tion would be a most welcome relief.
Another appealing technique which may eliminate unneces-
sary court backlog is the creation of specialized panels charged
with the function of screening out weak claims.6" These panels pro-
vide a measure of relief in medical malpractice and other technical
lawsuits. The modus operandi is that certain categories of claims
38 The Council of Better Business Bureaus has established a National Consumer Arbi-
tration Program through its local office. Determan, The Arbitration of Small Claims, 10
FORUM 831, 835 (1975). Initially, the parties must agree in writing to be bound by the arbi-
tration. Thereafter, they are allowed to choose the arbitrators from a pool of volunteers. Id.
at 835-36. The average time from the request for arbitration until the award is 21 days. Id.
at 836.
51 The unwillingness of merchants to be bound by arbitration and the consumers' mis-
trust of arbitration boards sponsored by the business community are the main obstacles to
greater success with these associations. JOHNSON & KANTOR, supra note 12, at 52.
80 THE RHETORICAL ARISTOTLE 77-78 (D. Appleton ed. 1932). Although mainly derived
from the Roman law, arbitration dates back at least as far as 3100 B.C. Jalet, Judicial
Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519, 519 (1960).
8" For several years, arbitration has been used to settle medical malpractice cases under
state general rules of arbitration. Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A
First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 665, 682 (1976). This is accomplished by the parties agreeing
in their initial contract to submit all claims to arbitration. Henderson, Contractual
Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, 59 VA. L.
REV. 947, 948 (1972). At least four states, however, have enacted legislation which deals
specifically with the arbitration of medical malpractice cases. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295
(West Supp. 1981); LA. RE. STAT. ANN. § 9:4230-4236 (West Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.5040-.5065 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.21-.24 (Page Supp.
1980). Ohio mandates submission with a right to appeal, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2711.21, whereas Michigan, California, and Louisiana permit voluntary binding arbitration.
See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West Supp. 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4231-4232
(West Supp. 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5041-.5042 (Supp. 1981). See generally Recent
Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, supra, at 682-83.
62 1980 REPORT, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION.
13 Screening panels differ from arbitration in many respects. The primary function of
screening panels is to determine which claims should proceed to trial and which claims
should be screened out as meritless. Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A
First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655, 679 (1976). Arbitration, on the other hand, resolves the
dispute. Id.
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initially are submitted to a panel. 4 Although a plaintiff may sue
even if the panel finds for the defendant, the plaintiff must post a
bond which can be forfeited if he subsequently loses at trial.6 5 Con-
versely, a panel decision in a plaintiff's favor is likely to accelerate
the defendant's settlement efforts.
Forums using conciliation, mediation, and arbitration present
another appealing alternative. Complaints against governmental
activities could be processed through an ombudsman who would
make recommendations for action through a milieu of informal and
speedy procedures."6 Consumer complaint mechanisms may exert
persuasive economic and social pressures and foster cooperation.
For example, private and governmental consumer protection agen-
cies may handle complaints through a combination of persuasion,
' Under a Louisiana statute, a malpractice action may not be commenced until the
case has been presented to a medical review panel. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(B)
(West 1977). The screening panel consists of a nonvoting attorney, a physician chosen by
the plaintiff, a physician chosen by the defendant, and a physician selected by the two med-
ical panelists. Id. .§ 40:1299.47(C) (West Supp. 1981). The medical panelists are not re-
stricted to the testimony presented by the parties. See id. § 40:1299.47(F) (West 1977). The
panelists may request the production of any necessary information and may even consult
with other medical authorities. Id. All of the information must be made available to the
parties. Id.
65 Screening procedures have been designed carefully to avoid constitutional challenges
on the grounds of a denial of due process, equal protection or the right to a trial. Comment,
Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, supra note 63, at 681; see
Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 471-73 (E.D. La. 1979); Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1265-69 (La. 1978); Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 758-61,
381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748-49 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1976). Allowing the plaintiff to proceed
with a suit regardless of the panel's findings avoids constitutional issues while exposing friv-
olous claims and encouraging the settlement of valid claims. Comment, Recent Medical
Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, supra note 63, at 681-82. One consequence of
using screening panels is that it will be extremely difficult for the plaintiff to overcome the
weight of an adverse panel decision if he proceeds to trial. Id. at 681. Panel decisions com-
monly are admissible as some evidence in subsequent malpractice actions. See, e.g., LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47(H) (West 1977); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148-a(8) (McKinney Supp. 1980)
(panel members must concur on question of liability for recommendation to be admissible).
6 The ombudsman concept originated in Sweden. Frank, State Ombudsman Legisla-
tion in the United States, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397, 397-98 (1975). The ombudsman is an
"independent, high-level public official who receives complaints from aggrieved persons
against governmental agencies, officials, and employees; conducts an investigation; and, if
the complaints are justified, recommends corrective action." Id. at 398. In Hawaii, for exam-
ple, the ombudsman is given wide discretion in instituting and conducting investigations of
governmental agencies and their employees. See HAWAII REV. STAT. § 96-6(a) (1976)
(ombudsman may investigate any complaint which he deems appropriate); § 96-6(b)
(ombudsman may investigate on his own motion); 96-9(a) (ombudsman may make inquiries,
obtain information, inspect without notice and hold private hearings); § 96-10(1)
(ombudsman may compel by subpoena); § 96-10(2) (ombudsman may compel production of
documents).
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education, mediation, and litigation." After an initial investiga-
tion, a hearing officer may request that the offending firm under-
take suggested remedial action. 8 If this proves ineffective, the
complaint may move to a mediation stage and ultimately to litiga-
tion. 9 Such a process diverts potential claims from the courts
while offering access to a system of redress for grievances that
would not have reached the courts in any event.
Neighborhood Community Justice Centers occasionally may
offer a more efficacious and accessible system of justice than that
provided by the traditional legal system. 0 Operating through the
efforts of local community members, these centers can divert from
the courts a significant portion of the more commonly encountered
community disputes-intrafamilial conflicts, neighbor grievances,
relatively minor property or monetary disagreements, landlord-
tenant disputes, and even minor offenses.7 1 These centers can offer
a variety of services including conciliation, mediation, and deci-
sionmaking.72 Because community mores are an integral part of
67 Companies such as Westinghouse, Whirlpool, Ford Motor Company, and Chrysler
Motor Company have set up "hot lines" to handle consumer complaints. See JOHNSON &
KANTOR, supra note 12, at 66. Similarly, trade associations and the Better Business Bureau
have established panels to recommend solutions for consumer disputes. Id. at 66-67. Gov-
ernmental consumer protection agencies generally are more effective than private agencies
because they "are able to back up their 'suggestions' for resolution with potent sanctions
such as injunctions and other orders." Id. at 67.
68 See Steele, Fraud, Dispute, and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Com-
plaints, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1107, 1154 (1975). Frequently, the hearing officer recommends
repair or replacement of the defective article. Id. A study of an Illinois consumer fraud
bureau reveals that 38% of the complaints were closed after an initial screening by the
hearing officer, 44% were closed after the seller's answer and 18% were scheduled for hear-
ings. Id. at 1147.
69 See generally id. at 1156-68.
70 The model for Neighborhood Community Justice Centers originated with the Public
Offices for Legal Information and Conciliation (ORA) in Hamburg, Germany. See FORD
FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 48. The ORA uses lawyers and judges to work on a voluntary
basis in neighborhoods throughout Hamburg. Id. The ORA offers advice and mediates dis-
putes involving poor and moderate income people. Id. at 49. Statistics indicate that the
ORA handles about 3,000 complaints a year. Id.
' Similar programs have been initiated in the United States. In New York City, for
example, the civil court attempts to have landlord and tenant disputes mediated before
trial. FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 51; see N.Y. City Civ. Ct. R. § 2900.20 (McKinney
Supp. 1980). Hearing officers, who are familiar with the building industry, drastically reduce
the number of cases which proceed to trial. FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 51.
72 The Community Justice Board Program in San Francisco offers conciliation and me-
diation for minor criminal matters, neighborhood disputes, and certain civil complaints. See
FORD FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 51. New York City uses paralegals to assist parties
whose cases are scheduled for arbitration in small claims court. E. JOHNSON, JR., A PRELIMI-
NARY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROCESSING CIVIL DISPUTES 62 (1978).
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this informal process, resolution of these types of disputes in this
fashion may be the better font of justice.
With respect to civil disputes, it is imperative that complex
issues be eliminated from the litigation scheme, legal rights be sim-
plified, and a greater number of disputes be diverted from the
court system. Similarly, not all legal breakdowns require court in-
volvement or the same degree of it. Those models selected as alter-
natives must be simple, inexpensive, and of a sufficiently high or-
der to be acceptable channels for diversion. Initially, however,
attitudes must change so as to embrace a willingness to accept
novel alternatives. For example, the legal community must recog-
nize that the role of an advocate need not always be filled by an
attorney. Although some alternatives may offer a less precise form
of justice, a less precise forum which maintains an equitable bal-
ance between adversaries is preferable to no forum at all.
The call is not necessarily for immediate full-scale implemen-
tation. Experimentation may well be more appropriate since many
of the measures have been developed only recently. Nevertheless,
action is essential if there is to be a reduction in delay and ade-
quate access to forums of dispute resolution. "The debate is no
longer whether we shall move, but what we shall do."'73
THE CRIMINAL SYSTEM
Turning to the criminal field, we are confronted with rising
crime rates and overcrowded detention facilities which cry out for
alternatives to the conventional forms of processing and punish-
ment.7 These stark realities cannot be wished away.
Mediation or Arbitration Alternatives
Various commentators have recommended that a mediation or
arbitration model be incorporated into our criminal justice system
to supplement the traditional adjudicative scheme. 5 Under either
7' Address by the Honorable Charles D. Breitel, Chief Judge of the State of New York,
at the Commencement of the 1974 Legislative Session (Feb. 27, 1974), reprinted in 29 THE
RECORD 259 (1974).
" See generally Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Soci-
ety, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 653 (1971); Stulberg, A Civil Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 39
ALB. L. REv. 359 (1975); Wilson, Delay and Congestion in the Criminal Courts, 46 FLA. B.J.
88 (1972).
71 See, e.g., Greacen, Arbitration: A Tool for Criminal Cases, 2 BARRISTER 10, 53 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Greacen]; Smith & Pollack, The Courts Stand Indicted in New York
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program, a criminal offense would be viewed not only as a situation
requiring the imposition of community sanctions but also as a dis-
pute to be resolved between victim and offender.76 Moreover,
mediation or arbitration offers greater flexibility in factfinding and
discipline imposition as well as informality, speed, economy,
and an opportunity to remedy the underlying difficulty.7 7 John
Greacen, former Deputy Director of the National Institute for Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, urges that certain types of of-
fenses be processed without full criminal justice intervention ex-
cept where accommodation between the parties proves impossi-
ble.78 By employing victim-offender negotiations to determine an
appropriate response to the crime, this approach makes criminal
offenders answerable to their victims. The agreement would be re-
viewed to ensure it is neither too severe nor too lenient and, if no
agreement is reached, conventional guilt-and-sanction-determining
procedures would be provided.79 This arbitration model could be
applied to single victim cases, lesser offenses, and first nonviolent
felony offenders.
Ohio employs a mediation plan in which law students assist 0
the victim and offender to achieve resolution by conducting infor-
mal hearings relating to ordinance violations, misdemeanors, and
minor felonies."1 For example, the parties can agree on repayment,
City, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 252, 259 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Smith & Pollack].
78 The Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution conducts a program in Harlem
which imposes community sanctions. See Smith and Pollack, supra note 75, at 259. See also
Weisbrod, The Need for Diversion of Interpersonal Criminal Complaints: The IMCR Center
(1977) (unpublished master's thesis in John Jay College). Criminal cases involving individu-
als who are known to each other are handled by arbitration. Referrals are made to the Insti-
tute by police officers. Smith and Pollack, supra note 75, at 259. Cases are heard by a panel
of three community members trained in arbitration work. Solving the problem within the
community avoids the need for criminal prosecutions. Id.
7 See generally Snyder, Crime and Community Mediation-The Boston Experience:
A Preliminary Report on the Dorchester Urban Court Program, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 737.
78 Greacen, supra note 75, at 13.
79 Id.
8o Law student participation in supervised clinical programs is authorized in almost
every state by statute, court rule or state bar regulation. Leleiko, State and Federal Rules
Permitting the Student Practice of Law: Comparisons and Comments, in INSTITUTE OF JU-
DICIAL ADMINISTRATION, BAR ADMISSION RULES AND STUDENT PRACTICE RULES 914 (F. Klein
ed. 1978); e.g., Application of Chemung County Neighborhood Servs., Inc., 42 App. Div. 2d
1016, 1016, 348 N.Y.S.2d 230, 230-31 (3d Dep't 1973); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 484 (McKinney 1968
& Supp. 1980); SUP. CT. R. FOR THE OHIO BAR 2. See generally Documentary Supplement,
Student Practice as a Method of Legal Education and a Means of Providing Legal Assist-
ance to Indigents: An Empirical Study, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363 (1973).
81 See Greacen, supra note 75, at 53; D. McGILLIS AND J. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUS-
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compensation, or cessation of the offensive behavior.8 2 The success
of the Ohio plan can be measured by contrasting the $20 cost per
disposition with the $100 required when traditional criminal jus-
tice procedures are used.83 Additionally, only four percent of the
matters proceed any further in the criminal justice system.8 4
Arizona provides a diversion project for first felony offenders
featuring restitution and victim-offender confrontation.85 Prosecu-
tors screen cases and refer defendants to a diversion unit for a vol-
untary probation period ranging from 6 months to 1 year, with su-
pervision by staff and community volunteers.88 When the diversion
unit, the prosecutor, and the offender approve the probation agree-
ment, prosecution is discontinued conditionally upon satisfactory
completion of probation.8 7 It should be noted, however, that the
victim must consent to the diversion process."s
Community courts and mediation forums offer another avenue
of dispute resolution for offenders diverted out of the traditional
criminal justice system. 9 Voluntary access to such forums could be
TICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTEN'IAL MODELS 108-21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
McGILLIS & MULLEN]. The Columbus Night Prosecutor Program was established in 1971
through the joint efforts of the Capital University Law School and the Columbus Attorney's
office. Id. at 108. Cases involving interpersonal disputes, bad checks, violations of city ordi-
nances and consumer complaints are referred to the project by the prosecutor's office and
project staff clerks. Id. Mutual agreement between disputants is achieved after an explora-
tion of the causes underlying the problem. Each party is provided with an opportunity to
present his version of the occurrence to the student hearing officer. Although the student
hearing officers inform the parties of possible criminal sanctions, solutions typically are
achieved after student questioning and commentary. Id. at 115.
82 See Greacen, supra note 75, at 53.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. Several types of diversion programs are available in Pima County, Arizona.
Prosecutorial discretion is used to refer defendants to a program once certain criteria are
met: (1) the victim must consent to the diversion; (2) the defendant must be a first time
offender; and (3) the offense must be nonviolent in nature. Additionally, the approval of the
arresting officer is requested. Telephone Conversation with Edward C. Nesbitt, Esq., Office
of County Attorney, Pima County, Arizona (Aug. 27, 1981).
10 Greacen, supra note 75, at 53.
17 Id. A criminal charge will be dismissed without prejudice after the defendant com-
pletes 1 month in a diversion program. After successfully completing the entire program, the
charge is dismissed with prejudice. Telephone Conversation with Edward C. Nesbitt, Esq.,
Office of County Attorney, Pima County, Arizona (Aug. 27, 1981).
8' See note 85 supra.
82 Community courts are nonofficial judicial bodies composed of members of a geo-
graphically or functionally defined group. See Comment, Community Courts: An Alterna-
tive to Conventional Criminal Adjudication, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 1253, 1253 (1975). In addi-
tion to serving as a means to a more effective justice system, these courts serve as a cohesive
factor in a community. AARONSON, supra note 13, at 36.
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secured through referrals from police departments, social service
agencies, schools, and similar institutions9 o One of the advantages
of these mediation and community bodies is their promotion of
swifter and more personalized justice. 1  ,
A practice known as pretrial intervention also has been scruti-
nized as an alternative to the full-fledged processing of criminal
cases.9 2 Pretrial intervention occurs when the police or the prose-
cutor refer matters to social service, counseling, or rehabilitation
centers in lieu of further prosecution.93 Since effective pretrial in-
Few examples of community courts currently exist in the United States. Id. at 34. The
closest examples are found in specialized settings such as universities, prisons and labor
unions. Id. These tribunals are concerned primarily with internal disciplinary matters. Com-
ment, supra, at 1259. Arbitration programs currently in effect involve community participa-
tion in crime prevention. A community court, however, should be distinguished from an
arbitration program because a community court has adjudicatory capacity and the ability to
impose meaningful sanctions. Id. at 1286.
90 See generally Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution
Within the Judicial System, 3 VT. L. REV. 1 (1978); McGILLIS & MULLEN, supra note 81, at
49-52.
9 Not only may mediation, as an alternative to trial, produce insights and solu-
tions to individual grievances, but it offers the potential for grasping the larger
problem so often found in institutional settings where individual grievances tend
to pile up and then burst into more serious problems or even mpajor litigation.
Cratsley, supra, at 16-17.
92 Pretrial intervention or diversion refers to rehabilitative programs in which criminal
offenders are placed in a community rehabilitative program and prosecution is suspended.
Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 827 (1974). See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 (Page Supp. 1980). Pretrial intervention was a major recommen-
dation of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice.
See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 134 (1967). Although federal and state legislation
authorizing the diversion of narcotic-addict offenders has been in existence for some time,
pretrial diversion usually is authorized by the informal consent of the prosecutor. See Rob-
ertson, Pretrial Diversion of Drug Offenders: A Statutory Approach, 52 B.U.L. REV. 335,
335-39 (1972); Note, Addict Diversion: An Alternative Approach for the Criminal Justice
System, 60 GEo. L.J. 667, 670 (1972). See generally National Pretrial Intervention Service
Center, Legal Issues and Characteristics of Pretrial Intervention Programs, 4 CAP. U.L.
REV. 37 (1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion From the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827
(1974).
11 See National Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Legal Issues and Characteristics
of Pretrial Intervention Programs, 4 CAP. U.L. REV. 37, 37 (1975); Note, Pretrial Diversion
from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 827 (1974).
Pretrial intervention programs traditionally allow persons accused of crimes to have
their prosecution suspended while they are placed in community-based rehabilitation pro-
grams. These programs generally require a presumption of guilt as a requirement for admis-
sion to the program. See Stulberg, A Civil Alternative to Criminal Prosecution, 39 ALB. L.
REV. 359, 361 (1975). The typical program halts prosecution after arrest but prior to arraign-
ment. Persons selected for pretrial diversion are offered counseling, education and rehabili-
tation. Prosecution may be dismissed upon successful completion of a program. Legal Issues
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tervention requires the exercise of extreme care, coerced participa-
tion would be inappropriate.94 Eligibility criteria, of course, must
be based on equal treatment."' Finally, the accused must be ac-
corded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and must be pro-
vided with access to legal advice. 6
Legislative Possibilities
Legislative decriminalization of certain conduct and reclassifi-
cation of certain crimes would permit wider use of alternatives
such as administrative treatment for traffic, ordinance, housing,
and like violations. 7 Just as certain offenders and classes of of-
fenses are better suited to alternative methods of criminal adjudi-
cation, there are offenders and offenses better suited to unconven-
tional forms of punishment. A study by the Southern Regional
Office of the National Center for State Courts outlines a number of
and Characteristics of Pretrial Intervention Programs, supra, at 37. As in any criminal
case, formal judicial action is required to dismiss the charge once a divertee has been for-
mally charged with a crime. Id. at 54.
'4 The potential benefits from participation in pretrial intervention programs are often
overstated while the potential risks to an unsuccessful participant are often understated.
AARONSON, supra note 13, at 25. One obvious criticism is that it is difficult to assess the
individual's capacity for making a voluntary decision because of the pendency of criminal
charges. Id. Program planners, however, can develop procedures for insuring voluntary par-
ticipation. Id.
95 Various types of eligibility requirements for intervention programs give rise to equal
protection challenges. See National Pretrial Intervention Service Center, Legal Issues and
Characteristics of Pretrial Intervention Programs, 4 CAP. U.L. REv. 37, 59 (1975). Eligibility
criteria are not necessarily offensive if the selection process does not discriminate unreason-
ably by arbitrarily excluding certain classes of defendants. Id. at 59-68.
11 AARONSON, supra note 13, at 27. Judicial hearings, administrative hearings, adminis-
trative consideration of applications and peer review can be used to increase the procedural
fairness of pretrial programs. Id. A study by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and
Criminal Justice recommends that each intervention program subject its policy and proce-
dures to independent legal review, including consideration of the eligibility requirements
and intake procedures, the provisions for maintaining confidentiality, and the procedural
safeguards for protecting the rights of participants. Id.
11 Decriminalization of victimless crimes is one method of relieving court congestion.
See Smith & Pollack, supra note 75, at 259. A study by the National Institute of Law En-
forcement and Criminal Justice lists three types of decriminalization. AARONSON, supra note
13, at 34. Decriminalization has not been widely adopted. See, e.g., NEv. REv. STAT. §
244.345 (1979) (prohibiting licensing of prostitution in counties with populations of 250,000
or more). Reclassification, however, has been given a more favorable reception. AARONSON,
supra note 13, at 34; see N.J. Rav. STAT. § 37-2(b) (Supp. 1981) (liberalizing gambling laws).
The third approach is the substitution of a noncriminal response to certain conduct. AARON-
SON, supra note 13, at 34. In the District of Columbia, the nonpenal handling of alcoholics
illustrates this approach. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-522 to 24-530 (1973 & Supp. V 1978).
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penal sanctions."" Victim compensation can be employed as an al-
ternative to ordinary incarceration and as part of a probation or
conditional discharge program.99 Apart from granting institutional
recognition to the victim of criminal conduct, such conditions allow
the defendant to recognize the consequences of his antisocial be-
havior, thereby developing an awareness that his conduct injured
another human being and not merely society as an abstraction. 00
"Shock" probation may be employed to require the observa-
tion of drunk drivers at a hospital emergency room or a detoxifica-
tion center.' 0 ' Similarly, the short-term incarceration of less
dangerous first time offenders is an alternative form of punishment
which should be explored. Furthermore, a court could impose a
condition of probation requiring the guilty offender to engage in
community service or to participate in an approved program of
medical or psychiatric treatment.10 2 The "day fine" used in the
Scandinavian countries should also be considered. 03
9" The Preliminary Report of the Southern Regional Office of the National Center for
State Courts (Atlanta, Georgia 1981). The final report will be published in October 1981.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 A "shock" program has been instituted at Rahway State Prison in New Jersey. In-
mates confronted juvenile delinquents and explained prison life to them in graphic detail.
10:10 CORRECTIONS DIGEST 4 (May 11, 1979). Through cursing and shouting, the inmates
inform the juvenile offenders of sexual assaults, beatings, and other prison experiences. D.
GIBBONS, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR 333 (3d ed. 1981).
Dr. Jerome Miller, head of the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, has
expressed criticism of the program because of the lack of evidence that the program reduces
delinquency. See CORRECTIONS DIGEST, supra, at 4. Similarly, one commentator has ob-
served that there are moral questions to be examined before exposing youths to shock pro-
grams of the Rahway variety. GIBBONS, supra at 33. While 57% of the exposed juvenile
offenders were not charged with new offenses within six months, 78% of an unexposed con-
trol group also had not been charged. Id.
102 See United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664 (4th Cir. 1979) (sentencing court has
broad discretion and may impose charitable service as a condition of probation); 18 U.S.C. §
3651 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980).
los See AARONSON, supra note 13, at 14. The Swedish Penal Code provides day fines
ranging from 1 to 120 days. The amount of the fine is determined on the basis of the defen-
dant's income, wealth, obligations to dependants and other reasonable economic circum-
stances. The severity of the crime is also considered. 25 PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN § 2 (as
amended Jan. 1, 1972), reprinted in THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 79 (T.
Sellin trans. 1972).
The Danish Criminal Code also imposes day fines. See DANISH CRIMINAL CODE § 51(1)
(1930), reprinted in THE DANISH CRIMINAL CODE 36 (1958). A single daily fine corresponds
proportionately to the income and living conditions of the defendant. Id. The gravity of the
offense and the previous record of the defendant are also considered in fixing the amount of
the day fine. DANISH CRIMINAL CODE § 80(1) (1930), reprinted in THE DANISH CRIMINAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Alternative detention programs might be considered where im-
prisonment is either indicated by the circumstances or mandated
by statute. Work release programs should be expanded beyond the
traditional prison setting to include the utilization of residential
facilities. Increased use should be made of intermittent incarcera-
tion, which permits a defendant to maintain employment and re-
main in the community mainstream.104 These options presently are
authorized by statute in New York.'05
CONCLUSION
The list of alternatives is long and the opportunity for im-
provement should not be lost. My belief is that some of these alter-
natives will reduce crime. Certainly, they will free scarce resources
for more economical and efficient resolution of disputes. Some of
these techniques may improve the quality of justice by individual-
izing treatment at the adjudication and dispositional stages and by
encouraging victim-offender participation in the process of resolu-
tion. Such techniques would lend greater legitimacy to the system
as a whole. Expanded application of available options and the de-
velopment of novel approaches toward the resolution of civil and
criminal contests will better serve the interests of justice. While
the major portion of the case flow should be directed through the
CODE 49 (1958).
104 See, e.g., People v. Moretti, 60 App. Div. 2d 849, 849, 400 N.Y.S.2d 578, 578 (2d
Dep't 1978); People v. Snyder, 50 App. Div. 2d 939, 939-40, 377 N.Y.S.2d 196, 196 (2d Dep't
1975). Loss of employment and financial harm are factors which a court will consider in
determining whether intermittent incarceration is appropriate. People v. Warren, 79 Misc.
2d 777, 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 961, 969 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom. People v. Apted, 51 App. Div. 2d 1024, 381 N.Y.S.2d 423 (2d Dep't 1976).
105 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 65.00, 65.05, 65.10, 85.00 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980).
New York provides for a sentence of probation which allows an offender to avoid institu-
tional confinement. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980). The de-
fendant is allowed to remain in the community while receiving guidance and supervision
under a probation program. See People v. Warren, 79 Misc. 2d 777, 784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 961,
969 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. People v. Apted, 51
App. Div. 2d 1024, 381 N.Y.S.2d 423 (2d Dep't 1976). When both probation and imprison-
ment are inappropriate, a sentence of conditional discharge is available for lesser offenses.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.05 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980). For both probation and condi-
tional discharge, the law authorizes the imposition of conditions that are "reasonably neces-
sary to insure the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980).
Another alternative available in New York is intermittent imprisonment through which
a sentence can be served on specified days during a certain period. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
85.00 (McKinney 1975). This alternative also allows an offender to remain employed while
serving his sentence.
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highway of the courts, reliance also should be placed upon the by-
ways which have been developed to shoulder part of the burden.
